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For loan oft loses both itself and friend, 
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry 
Hamlet, Act I, scene 2, 75-77 
Europe’s leaders should have heeded Lord Polonius’ 
wise words to his son Laertes. The countries now 
struggling under a mountain of debt should have 
realized earlier that excessive reliance on borrowing 
invites excessive consumption and wasteful 
investment. But the leaders of Germany and the 
other creditor countries should also be aware that a 
lender can lose both its capital and its friends.  
This is what is now happening with the rescue 
operations of Ireland and Greece. Irish politicians 
and many commentators have heavily criticized the 
high interest rates (close to 6%) the European 
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) has imposed on the 
€67 billion loan it will provide to the country. This 
interest rate is far greater than the growth rate 
Ireland can hope for and will thus lead to a snowball 
effect under which high interest payments increase 
the debt burden faster than the capacity of the Irish 
economy, and thus its government, to create the 
resources to service this debt. 
However, this widespread impression that the ‘bail-
out’ of Ireland constituted an onerous interest rate 
‘diktat’ by the EFSF is misleading. A much larger 
‘bail-out’ on very generous terms has taken place 
silently via the balance sheet of the ECB. Here again 
public attention has focused on a side show, namely 
the direct purchases of distressed government 
bonds by the ECB. However, the portfolio of 
government bonds held by the ECB under its 
‘securities markets programme’ has so far 
amounted only to about €70 billion, of which only 
part will have been in Greek and Irish bonds. But 
more importantly, the ECB has not provided any 
fresh money to the countries concerned by buying 
their bonds in the secondary market. It has only 
increased the price at which some investors were 
able to sell their holdings of Greek and other bonds. 
The ECB is, however, providing direct support to 
the countries in difficulties via its normal monetary 
policy operations, which allow the banking systems 
of these countries to refinance themselves at the 
official rate of 1%. This has resulted in an infusion 
of liquidity of an unprecedented magnitude given 
the small size of these economies. For example, the 
banking systems of Greece and Ireland have now 
received funding worth about €100 billion each, 
representing 40% of national income in the case of 
Greece and close to 80% of GNI in the case Ireland. 
It is clear that without this injection of essentially 
free liquidity, both countries would have been 
insolvent a long time ago. This huge infusion of 
liquidity is of course just a by-product of the way 
the ECB’s monetary policy works and not a tailor-
made approach for countries in difficulties (unlike 
the securities markets programme and the EFSF), 
but it implies a considerable subsidy given that few 
Greek or Irish banks could have funded themselves 
at reasonable terms in the interbank market over 
most of last year.  
Moreover, on top of the funding received via the 
normal repo operations, both the Greek and the  
Irish central bank support their banking systems 
with considerable amounts of ‘emergency liquidity 
assistance’ (ELA). The ELA is in effect money 
creation by the national central bank. It is used to 
pay out the foreign depositors who are running 
from the Irish banks as quickly as they can.  The 
Irish central bank charges reportedly a ‘penalty’ 
interest rate of 3% on its ELA loans, but given that 
the banks effectively belong to the government and 
that the interest on the ELA will remain with the 
Irish central bank, the interest rate on ELA loans 
remains within the country. All the Irish central 
bank has to do is to reverse the operation some time 
later. ELA thus represents effectively a zero interest 
loan to the country. 
ELA is shrouded in secrecy (because supposedly 
nobody is supposed to know that the Irish banks are 
in difficulties). But the balance sheet of the Irish 
central bank suggests that it has provided Irish 
banks with about €40 billion in emergency 
liquidity. This is equivalent to about 30% of Irish 
GNI.1 
How much is the subsidy of cheap ECB funding 
worth? The risk premia for banks are usually 
somewhat higher that of their sovereign. The risk 
premium for the Greek government is about 800 
bps, that of Ireland around 600 bps. This implies 
that Greece is currently receiving a subsidy worth 
around 3.2% of its GNI. For Ireland the sum of 
‘normal’ ECB funding and ELA, which amount to 
about 110% of GNI, must be worth close to 7% of 
national income. 
Insolvency can certainly be avoided as long as 
liquidity is (almost) free and available in unlimited 
amounts. However, unlimited cheap financing 
(‘liquefaction’) has its disadvantages. First of all, it 
is obviously not a solution for insolvent debtors; it 
just postpones the day of reckoning – and makes it 
more painful when it does arrive because the debt 
burden will be even larger. 
                                                            
1 For completeness, one should note that the first large ELA 
operations occurred in 2008 when the Belgian Central Bank 
gave €30 billion to Fortis and the Bundesbank lent €80 
billion to HRE (Hypo Real Estate Holding). But both loans 
amounted to a small fraction of GDP and were repaid within 
a few months. 
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Bank will remain by far the cheapest source of 
funds for banks in the euro periphery. Those 
countries will thus try to maintain and increase 
their recourse to ECB funding for as long as 
possible, with the result that the risk on the balance 
sheet of the ECB will also increase. This is why the 
ECB recently had to tighten its eligibility criteria for 
the collateral it accepts. Banks in the periphery (and 
some weak banks in core euro states) had obviously 
a tendency to transform ever-more risky parts of 
their assets into securities that they could use as 
collateral at the ECB’s windows. Is there a ‘third 
way’ between bankruptcy and continuing unlimited 
liquidity support? The obvious way out should be 
controlled rescheduling and/or restructuring in 
order to avoid turning part of the euro periphery 
into ‘zombie countries’. 
The problem is that no debtor will ever appear 
insolvent (and admit to it) in an environment of 
essentially free money. As long as interest rates 
remain close to zero and liquidity is available 
without limits, no debtor will have an interest to 
engage in a restructuring or rescheduling.  
This is the EU’s Shakespearean dilemma: political 
authorities have to take over the function of capital 
markets. The ECB and the EFSF must now decide 
which countries and which banks have access to 
funding and on what terms.2 They risk losing “both 
itself and friend”. Politicians on all sides must be 











2 Representatives of the ECB have rightly pointed out that the 
capital market had made a fundamental mistake in funding 
Greece for too long a period of time at excessively low risk 
premia; and that the market (and the ratings agencies) might 
now err in the opposite direction by overestimating the risk of 
insolvency. But how can one be sure that the ECB is right to 
lend 40% of GDP at a zero risk premium? 